FOLLOW THE MONEY
“Follow the money,” as some of you
may recall, was the advice Deep Throat gave Bob Woodward as he attempted to
unravel the Watergate scandal. Though
the scale of Watergate may have been dwarfed by more recent campaign finance
capers, Watergate remains emblematic of the corrupting influence of money on
politics. Money, in Jesse Unruh’s
immortal words, may be the mother’s milk of politics, but it is also its
poisoned chalice.
Here’s a recent example. Earlier this year the bankruptcy reform bill
was pending in the Congress. In a
private session of Senate and House members negotiating resolution of
differences in the bills passed by the two houses, Senator Sessions of Alabama,
chairman of the Senate Judiciary subcommittee with jurisdiction of the bill,
slipped in a provision that barred enforcement of foreign judgments against
American investors in Lloyds if they could show that there had been
misrepresentations. Shortly before this,
a small group of unhappy American investors from outside of Alabama had donated
$8,500 to Sessions’ campaign chest. Similar examples abound.
Campaign finance has been the
whipping boy of politics for many years.
It became a high profile issue during the 2000 presidential campaign
when Senator McCain rode the issue to considerable success in the
primaries. At the same time politicians
have been deeply conflicted about it, particularly incumbents intent on holding
on to their offices with the help of generous contributors whose interests they
may have at heart. It is a subject rich
with rhetoric, a subject about which nearly everyone has an opinion but also
one about which there is much more heat than light. Let’s begin with a look at the historical
background.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Interest in campaign finance
regulation first arose in the late 19th century when reformers became alarmed
over large contributions by corporations, railroads, banks and wealthy
individuals that became the major source of political funds. Mark Hanna, the powerful Republican political
strategist said: “There are two things that are important in politics. The first is money, and I can’t remember what
the second is.” Before big corporations
entered the picture, party leaders paid most of the campaign costs. When
Tammany Hall controlled New York City in the 1880s, the machine levied a tax of
6 percent on municipal office holders.
In addition candidates for office had to kick in money to help finance
their own races. But this all changed as
wealthy and powerful industrialists entered the picture. The prospect of William Jennings Bryan being
elected president so frightened corporate interests that it enabled Hanna to
raise an estimated $4 million, in 1896 dollars.
Theodore Roosevelt commented that Hannah sold McKinley “as if he were a
patent medicine.” Roosevelt himself ran
with the financial support of railroads, oil companies and Wall Street. When after the election he called for a tax
on corporations, the oilman Henry Flagler said “I have no command of the
English language that enables me to express my feelings regarding Mr.
Roosevelt.”
Still Democrats complained that
corporations were buying influence by making large contributions to the
Roosevelt campaign. This led to the
adoption by Congress in 1907 of the Tillman act prohibiting contributions by
corporations and national banks to political campaigns. The act remains on the books but it has been
rendered largely ineffective by PACs and soft money about which more later.
In 1910 Congress adopted the Corrupt
Practices Act which required political parties, but not candidates, to report
all receipts and expenditures but only after an election. In 1911 Congress established the first
spending limits but, without reporting requirements or enforcement, they had no
practical effect. Following the Teapot
Dome scandal in 1925, Congress required all political committees to file
quarterly reports and imposed spending limits of $25,000 for Senate campaigns
and $5,000 for House campaigns. But
these laws too were ineffective for lack of enforcement machinery, and they
were widely ignored. In 1940 Congress
again adopted new limits on campaign contributions and spending but they had no
more practical effect than the earlier limits.
Congress did adopt one piece of
significant legislation about this time. In 1939, fearing that the expanding
federal workforce under the New Deal would greatly strengthen the Democrats’
ability to raise funds, it passed the Hatch Act, prohibiting political activity
by federal Civil Service employees. It
prohibited Civil Service employees from soliciting political contributions and
protected them from being forced to make campaign contributions. The Hatch Act
remains on the books and last year nearly tripped up Vice President Gore’s
campaign.
When in the 1940s labor unions became
political players and the major source of funds for the Democratic Party,
Congress included in the Taft-Hartley act a prohibition against the use of
union treasury funds for political contributions. This put unions on a par with corporations
which since 1907 had been prohibited from using their funds for political
campaigns. However the CIO devised a way
around this restriction. In 1955 Walter
Reuther created a PAC--the so-called COPE, the Committee on Political
Education--which allowed it to solicit contributions from members and lump them
into major political contributions. More
about PACs later.
In the 1960s media spending
exploded. For example, in 1956, total
federal campaign spending was $155 million, of which $10 million was spent on
radio and TV. By 1968, spending had
doubled to $300 million, but media spending had increased six fold to $60
million. This caused Congress to worry,
not only over how much members had to raise for reelection, but also about the
threat from wealthy challengers who could use their own funds to finance a
successful media campaign to unseat incumbents.
In response Congress adopted the 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act
(FECA). This was the first meaningful
campaign finance reform. The act imposed limits on contributions, including how
much a candidate could contribute to his own campaign, and it limited campaign
expenditures, including putting a ceiling on media expenditures. But even with this legislation on the books,
campaign spending, both legal and illegal, rose dramatically, as demonstrated
by the notorious 1972 Nixon reelection campaign which led to Watergate.
Aroused by the reports of millions of
dollars of illegal contributions to CREEP, the Nixon campaign committee,
Congress passed the 1974 amendments to the FECA. They mark the high water mark of campaign
finance reform. These amendments set
limits on contributions by individuals, campaign committees and political
parties to federal election campaigns, and they also set spending ceilings for
presidential, Senate and House campaigns, and limited what parties could spend
on behalf of candidates. Congress also provided public financing for
presidential campaigns through the voluntary check-off on income tax returns
enabling taxpayers to divert $1 (now $3) to a public fund; presidential
candidates became eligible for public funding if they limited their overall
spending. And Congress established the
first enforcement mechanism, the Federal Election Commission, whose powers,
however, were severely circumscribed.
But the ink was hardly dry on the
1974 amendments when Senator James Buckley brought suit against Francis Valeo,
the Secretary of the Senate, to have the law declared unconstitutional. This suit eventually led to the Supreme Court
decision in Buckley v Valeo which struck down much of this legislation as
unconstitutional and established the legal framework that governs campaign
finance regulation today.
THE SUPREME COURT’S RULING IN BUCKLEY
v. VALEO
Needless to say the US Constitution
says nothing about campaign contributions or expenditures. Yet the Supreme Court has firmly planted the
First Amendment in the arena of political spending. The Buckley decision found a fundamental
distinction between political contributions and political expenditures. What is the difference between them? A contribution is money completely
given over to a candidate or a party or committee with the donor retaining no
control over its use. The recipient
decides how to spend it. In contrast, an
expenditure is money controlled and spent by the spender; whether it is
spent for the benefit of the spender or for someone else, the spender makes the
decision. In Buckley, the Court found
these two forms of campaign spending implicated very different First Amendment
concerns. A contribution merely
conveys the fact that the donor supports a candidate’s campaign, not the reason
why he supports him or her. The First
Amendment therefore permits broad limits on contributions so long as
regulations have a reasonable basis and do not starve campaigns or block out
basic signals of support. Though limitations on individual contributions
may somewhat burden political expression, they are supported by the interest in
preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption spawned by the real or
imagined coercive influence of large financial contributions on candidates’
positions or their actions if elected to office.
In contrast regulating expenditures,
according to the Court, raises more serious First Amendment concerns. Expenditures convey a message about
why the spender supports or opposes a candidate, and limiting them would
therefore restrict the quantity and quality of political discourse. Regulation of campaign expenditures is
therefore subject to strict First Amendment scrutiny and will be upheld only if
supported by a compelling state interest.
The Court thought that because expenditures posed much less of a danger
of quid pro quo corruption, there was no sufficient basis to justify
limitations on expenditures. The Court
rejected the Congressional rationale that expenditure limitations were needed
to equalize the relative ability of individuals and groups to affect the
outcome of elections. This goal of
equalization of the ability to speak--though attractive to many--could not be
squared with the First Amendment which does not permit government to restrict
the speech of some in society to enhance the relative voice of others. More about this later.
The rationale of Buckley survived in
the recent opinion in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri, in which a fractured Court
upheld the validity of a state-imposed $1000 contribution limit. But while Buckley was essentially unanimous,
there are now three justices who would strike down contribution limitations
altogether. Thus the future of campaign
finance regulation in the Supreme Court is uncertain.
This analytical framework under the
First Amendment applies to and governs state campaign finance regulation, and
the California Supreme Court and other courts have spoken on the subject.
California itself has an extensive system of regulations, enforced by the Fair
Political Practices Commission, which is in a constant state of flux as a result
of various initiatives and recurrent litigation. But that is beyond the scope of this paper.
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REGULATION AFTER
BUCKLEY
In 1976 Congress amended the FECA
again to comply with Buckley, and
established the contribution limits currently in effect
- An individual may give $1,000 per
federal election (primary and general)
to a federal candidate, $5,000 per year to state and local parties, $20,000 per year to national
parties, with a maximum aggregate annual
contribution limit of $25,000 per individual.
Adult members of a family are
counted separately.
- A political party may contribute
$5,000 per election to a candidate.
- A PAC may contribute $5,000 per
election to a candidate; $15,000 per
year to a national party committee, and $5,000 per year to a state and local party.
- Finally candidates are required to
disclose contributions frequently and
large contributions ($1,000 or more) within 48 hours if made within 20 days of the election. Candidates must also obtain donor information.
There are four hot button issues
under this scheme: hard money, PACs,
soft money and issue advocacy. These are
the concepts you need to understand to follow the ongoing debate about campaign
finance reform. I had thought that when
I scheduled this paper for June, it would be resolved but it is not. Though the Senate has passed a bill, it is
stalled in the House and so it will probably be fall before the denouement is
reached.
HARD MONEY
Hard money is money that has been
contributed in conformity with the campaign contribution limitations. It
differs from soft money which consists of contributions to the national parties
outside of the limitations of federal campaign finance law. As I have noted, the law limits hard money
contributions by political party committees.
But hard money contributed to a party, i.e. contributions that conform
to federal limitations, can in turn be contributed by the party to House and
Senate candidates without limitation; once they pass muster under the law, they
are free from restrictions. Soft money,
however, cannot, as we will see.
Because what candidates contribute to
their own campaigns is like a campaign expenditure, those contributions are not
limited, except that a presidential candidate who accepts public funds under
the check-off system also accepts the $60 million spending limit. Recall that
President Bush chose not to accept public funds and thus avoided the spending
limit.
PACS
Ironically the growth of PACs was the
direct result of the campaign finance regulation adopted in the 1970s. But PACs
had a history. The first one was created
by John L. Lewis in the 1930s--the Non-Partisan Political League--to enable the
members of the United Mine Workers Union to contribute to political campaigns. The second was COPE created in 1955--for a
similar purpose. But not until after the
1976 individual contribution limits went into effect did PACs become a major
factor. What drove their growth was the explosive rise in the cost of
campaigning, mostly due to the increasing reliance on media the cost of which
also rose dramatically. For example,
between 1980 and 1998, the average campaign expenditures of House candidates
rose from $150,000 to $500,000 and of Senate candidates from $1million to $3.5million. These are averages, not the mean. Even in a small state like Nevada with a
population of 1.5 million, the two
Senate candidates together spent more than $20 million in their recent
campaign.
The problem was aggravated by the
fact that contribution limits adopted in 1974 rapidly became quite unrealistic in relation to the
cost of campaigning. A $1,000
contribution in 1974 dollars is worth $380 in current dollars. On top of that, relatively few individuals
actually make political contributions. In 1996, only 630,000 individuals
contributed, and only 230,000 gave $1,000 or more. And most of these relatively small
contributions go to Republican candidates creating an imbalance in hard money
funds. This is for two reasons: there
are more Republicans among those who can afford to contribute and more
importantly Republicans over the year have developed an effective direct mail
money raising machine, such as the one run by Richard Vigery.
These circumstances generated
relentless pressure to find other sources of legal funds, which led to the
growth of PACs in the 1980s and early 1990s.
What you need to know about PACs is that there is no limit on
contributions to PACs--the limits apply only to contributions by
PACs--and there are no limits on the number of PACs nor is there a limit on the
number of PACs from whom a candidate may receive contributions. Ordinary PACs are limited to making
contributions of $1,000 per candidate per election, but they can give $5,000 to
another PAC and $15,000 to a national party committee. If a PAC is a multicandidate PAC, i.e. if it
contributes to five or more candidates and receives contributions from at least
51 individuals, it can give up to $5,000 per candidate per election.. The number of PACs rose from 600 in 1974 to
nearly 4,000 in 1999. PAC contributions
rose from $50 million in 1980 to $200 million in 1998. The four largest PACs are those operated by
the Realtors, the Automobile Dealers, the UAW and the AFL-CIO. Corporate and Labor Union contributions run
about equal but are vastly exceeded by contributions from special interest PACs
of all kinds, such as the Sierra Club, the NRA, the pharmaceutical industry,
etc..
On balance, have PACs been a good or
a bad thing? Opinions differ. The creation of so many PACs have diminished
the effectiveness of the statutory limits on individual contributions-individuals
can give unlimited amounts to many PACs and each PAC can contribute its
statutory limit to many candidates. PACs
have enabled special interests to buy access and influence. But PACs have also greatly increased public
participation in the election process.
Individuals who have never contributed to a campaign have became
contributors to PACs reflecting their particular interests. Thus a gun owner would probably not send
money to a presidential candidate but will give to the NRA PAC because he can
be sure his money will be used to serve his interests. But PAC contributions, although in theory
voluntary, are not necessarily so--union members and corporate employees or
associates come under pressure to contribute.
And another problem is that most PAC money--about 90%--went to incumbents
and for the most part to members of the majority party. PACs are thought to be a factor contributing
to the 90% reelection rate of Congress incumbents. Of course PACs have injected large amounts of
corporate, special interest and labor money into the political process but
because candidates must raise funds to run their campaigns, whether that in
itself is a bad thing is debatable.
SOFT MONEY
During the 1980s and early 1990s,
PACs were seen as the political bogey man and
reform efforts focused on them.
But with the 1996 election a new and more threatening evil emerged: soft
money. The pressure of rising campaign
costs--mostly media costs-- and the greater intensity of campaigning
essentially broke down the established limits.
What was needed was really big money, and PACs, subject to contribution
limits, could not deliver that. So soft money became the focus of campaign fund
raising. Soft money takes advantage of
the loop hole which permits parties to collect and spend unlimited amounts for
so called party building activities, such as voter registration, get out the
vote efforts, polling, and overhead expenses. The prohibitions against
contributions to campaigns by corporations and unions do not apply to soft
money. Soft money contributions come
from such things as coffees in the Oval Office and Lincoln bedroom sleep-overs,
from fund raising banquets and from people seeking presidential pardons. They come from drug companies, tobacco
companies, oil companies and song writers, among others. Some call it sewer money. In the 1998 cycle, Democrats spent $100
million in soft money, Republicans $120 million. In the 2000 election, soft money
contributions amounted to an estimated one half billion dollars.
Party building activity is regarded
as enormously important by the parties.
It’s not just buttons and posters but it involves maintaining much of
the tangible and intangible infrastructure that helps support political
campaigns. But the obvious problem is
where to draw the line between party support and candidate support. Soft money may only be spent by parties in
certain ways. Soft money cannot be used
to contribute directly to a candidate’s election campaign or to finance other
activities made on behalf of a candidate.
Soft money also cannot be used indirectly for independent expenditures
by parties advocating the election or defeat of a candidate. Money so used is considered express
advocacy and is equivalent to a campaign contribution and therefore subject
to the statutory limits. If the party could contribute, directly or indirectly,
to its candidate’s campaign, the contribution limits would become
meaningless. This is the reason for issue
advocacy.
ISSUE ADVOCACY
The distinction between issue
advocacy and express advocacy goes back to Buckley where the Court ruled that
individuals as well as political parties have the right to spend unlimited
amounts of their own money to participate in the electoral process on an
independent basis. The key words here
are independent basis. Issue advocacy, as opposed to express advocacy,
is considered independent and as such is protected expression under the First
Amendment. But if an individual or a
party expressly advocates the election defeat of a candidate--by using words
such as elect or defeat-- or if it coordinates expenditures with a candidate,
it is regarded a making a contribution and is subject to the contribution
limits. So if one of you wanted to pay for an ad on your own behalf advocating
the reelection, say, of Gray Davis, for example, that would count as a
contribution and be subject to the FECA reporting requirements and limits. On the other hand, if you paid for
advertising blaming the Republicans for the energy crisis, that would be
unregulated issue advocacy. Because of
the vast amounts of money in play here, it is obviously critical to know how to
distinguish between issue advocacy and express advocacy and it is not always
easy to distinguish. As a lobbyist for
the NRA said, what separates issue advocacy and express advocacy is a line in
the sand drawn on a windy day.
A typical issue ad would say
Congressman X voted to raise your taxes.
Tell him he is wrong. An express advocacy ad would say vote against
Congressman X. A court held that a newsletter
published by the Massachusetts Citizens for Life before a primary election
accompanied by a flyer listing candidates and identifying the pro-life
candidates was express advocacy. On the
other hand, it held that the publication of a voting guide by the Maine Right
to Life Committee which specifically disavowed endorsement of any candidate was
not express advocacy. Recent cases have
taken a narrow view of what constitutes express advocacy, requiring words like
vote for, elect, support, defeat or reject, thereby leaving a broad unregulated
area of political spending. Issue
advocacy exploded in 1996. You will
recall the intensive fundraising by President Clinton which financed a huge
issue oriented TV campaign at the beginning of 1996. This gave him a decided
edge which Dole could never overcome.
The ads were carefully scripted to focus on his agenda and
accomplishments, avoiding direct endorsement of the Clinton candidacy and
thereby passing as unregulated issue
advocacy though they had of course a powerful effect on the election. Similarly the large sums spent by the party
committees to encourage voter registration and voting on election day,
obviously targeted to maximize support for their particular candidates, are
issue advocacy. It is estimated that in
the 1996 cycle, about $300 million was spent on issue advertising.
Another problem is whether
advertising by a political party can ever be considered independent issue
advocacy as opposed to express advocacy which would be treated as a regulated
contribution. The Supreme Court, in a
splintered decision, opened the door to permitting parties to establish
separate political organizations to make campaign contributions independent of
and uncoordinated with candidates. This
surely stretches the notion of independent but it could also be a mixed
blessing when a state party takes a position on a controversial issue, such as
abortion, which diverges from the candidate’s.
Political parties are not alone in
running issue advocacy. Although contributions by PACs to campaigns are
regulated, as we have seen, their support of issue advocacy is not. Thus PACs
are free to run ads like the famous Harry and Louise Campaign against health
care reform. There was no doubt where
the sponsors stood on the candidates but it clearly passed as issue advocacy
and thus fell outside the limits on contributions. Also PACs that don’t finance election
campaigns do not need to register and are not regulated at all; they are able
to engage in legislative lobbying and grass roots organizing. To the extent they spend money to support
candidates, i.e. make their own independent uncoordinated expenditures, those
expenditures are protected by the First Amendment and not regulated. The potency of PACs is their ability to
aggregate contributions into large sums with heavy impact. PACs may be connected with parent
organizations, such as corporations and unions (which themselves could not
contribute funds), environmental, or other special interest organizations. Or they may be issue oriented, soliciting the
general public. Then there are the
so-called leadership PACs, established by some individual to support his own
political ambitions or purposes.
MCCAIN-FINEGOLD BILL
Over the years numerous reforms have
been proposed, none of which got to first base.
Although members of Congress have declared their support, they have
always done so confident that no bill would ever get past a Republican
filibuster. But by the year 2000 the
political climate had changed and to the surprise of most observers, the
Senate, after two weeks of debate, on April 2, 2001, passed the modified
McCain-Finegold bill by a vote of 59-41.
It would principally do these things:
-ban soft money contributions to and
expenditures by the national parties
and by candidates and incumbents of federal office;
- treats funds spent on
electioneering broadcasts by any individual coordinated
with a candidate as a contribution subject to contribution limits;
- increase the aggregate limit on
individual contributions to candidates from
$25,000 to $30,000.
Although substantially watered down
from the original McCain-Finegold proposal, the bill would have a major impact
on political parties which depend heavily on soft money for their
operations. Opponents argue that it
would seriously weaken political parties--some estimate the loss at $200
million. And it raises potential First
Amendment concerns by restricting the ability of individuals to pay for
broadcast advertising if it is coordinated with a candidate or his
committee. Although the House previously
passed the similar Shays-Meehan bill, its fate in the House is uncertain.
THE REFORM DEBATE
In the end the question remains,
putting aside the obvious political dimensions of the matter, what is the wise
policy choice. Is it a good government
issue, as many have argued, or is it an exercise in legislative sandcastle
building. Vast amounts are spent on political contributions, yet they are
modest compared to what pharmaceutical companies spend to promote their products
or what Philip Morris and Procter and Gamble spend on cigarette and toothpaste
advertising. And as Senator Mitch
McConnell from Kentucky, the leading opponent has said, the American people
spend less on political campaigns than they do on cat food. But cat food does not have the same impact on
our society as political contributions.
This is what Charles Keating had to say to a Congressional investigating
committee: “In answer to the question whether my financial support in any way
influenced several political figures to take up my cause, I want to say in the
most forceful way I can: I certainly hope so.”
But Senator Alan Cranston, one of the recipients of Keating’s
generosity, explained, testifying under oath: “Why would Keating, a
conservative Republican contribute to a liberal Democrat? He believes in participation. He is a patriot--you can’t know what is in
the mind of everyone who is contributing.”
Traditionally there has been a
liberal-conservative divide on this issue.
Conservatives say that the total of approximately $2 billion or so spent
on federal elections last year is insignificant compared to sums spent on
commercial advertising; Ford, for example, spent $800 million just to introduce
the Taurus. They see the media as generally aligned against conservative causes
and candidates and argue that finance reform would merely reinforce the great
advantage of the media in pressing their favored presumably liberal
causes. They see campaign finance
restrictions as an infringement of the right of free expression guaranteed by
the First Amendment and they find the equalizing rationale, i.e. the
neutralizing of the advantage of wealth, particularly obnoxious to the idea
that this is a republic, not a social democracy. And even if campaign finance
reform were adopted, they say, people would find a way around it to broadcast
their opinions.
The pro-reform position is that
Buckley should be overruled and the notion that the First Amendment prohibits
regulation of money rejected. Money is
not like speech because it has insidious effects, at least when it exceeds the
minimal amounts necessary to support political activity. Vast amounts of money can operate to drown
out the speech of others less well endowed. Although some argue that campaign
finance regulation may favor incumbents, it is clear that by far the most money
is raised by incumbents, giving them an undoubted advantage and discouraging
challengers. Proponents see the demands of money raising distracting and
undermining the effectiveness of office holders. They see the huge flow of money to incumbents
undermining public trust and confidence in their work. They see the outcomes of elections skewed by
the effect of massive spending. Thus
there are compelling justifications for regulating money flowing into politic
and regulation is not inconsistent with free speech--Roberts Rules of Order,
after all, are accepted as appropriate limitations on debate.
But it is no longer a simple
conservative vs. liberal issue. Since
Democrats have pulled even with Republicans in raising soft money, many feel
that restrictions will weaken the party.
Hillary Clinton, for example, raised $10 million in soft money for her
Senate race. Recently minority caucuses in the Congress objected that soft
money restrictions will hamper their ability to register voters and build up
minority participation in elections. And some Republicans now look with more
favor on these restrictions as a way to contain the financial muscle of labor
unions.
The fact is that, whether we like it
or not, money is the mother’s milk of politics. It costs money to run for office, and it gets
more expensive all the time. In the 1996
federal election cycle, candidates raised some $2 billion. Costs go up and one way or another,
candidates will have to find the money to run.
Restricting their access to money will not necessarily serve the
interest of democratic government. That
money buys access and influence is a fact of life, but it is the price of
having democratic elections. Whatever restrictions are adopted, while they may
make us feel good, circumstances and ambition will force candidates and parties
to find ways to raise the money they need to campaign successfully. After the
1974 reforms, PACs came along to meet the need for money. As the need for money
increased, soft money came along. The
McCain-Finegold restrictions on soft money are likely to shift power from
parties to wealthy individuals or groups intent on influencing elections.
The real problem lies not so much in
the amount of money in politics but in the staggering amount of time and effort
candidates and incumbents must devote to fund raising. Barbara Boxer said that to run for the Senate
in California, she must raise $10,000 each and every day, 365 days a year.
Former Senator Nancy Kessebaum said that we have to raise money all the time so
we don’t have much time for other things.
Limits on campaign contributions don’t make fund raising easier, they
probably make it more difficult. The
ideal of a campaign financed with small individual contributions has about as
much of a future as the family farm. Is
there an answer? Obviously, in the long
run the only answer is some form of public financing, perhaps publicly
subsidized access to TV time, but this would raise about as many problems as it
would solve and is not likely to be politically acceptable.
The chances of McCain-Finegold
passing the House are not good, but if it does I would not break out the
champagne, and if it does not, I would not shed tears.
WWS 6/2001